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Abstract
This paper investigates how CSR firms influence a Cournot oligopoly
with pollution. We define as CSR a firm that takes into account not
only its profits but also internalises its own share of the externality
and is sensitive to consumer surplus. The CSR firm obtains higher
profits compared to profit-seeking firms. Also, the presence of at least
one CSR firm improves social welfare and makes the first best Pigou-
vian taxation more lenient for Cournot firms. Finally, the CSR firm
may induce the other firms to invest in “green” technology.
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1 Introduction
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a form of corporate self-regulation.
There is not a unique definition of Corporate Social Responsibility1, but we
can summarise with the following: the CSR firm commits to a behaviour
that takes into account not only the shareholder interests (profit), but also
how the firm decisions affect the agents dealing with the firm (stakeholders),
such as employees, business partners, consumers and environment. Along
the years, the economic science mainly focused on the traditional profit-
maximising view of the firm2 and only recently started paying attention to a
vision of the firm based on CSR principles3.
In this paper we investigate how the presence of a CSR firm influences
a Cournot oligopoly with pollution. We define as CSR a firm that takes
into account not only its profits but also internalises its own share of the
externality and is sensitive to consumers’ welfare4.
We compare profits and social welfare of two industries. In the first one
all the firms are profit-seekers while in the second one there is one CSR firm
that cares also about its environmental impact and consumer surplus. The
1To cite some, for the World Business Council for Sustainable Development in its
publication “Making Good Business Sense” (Holme and Watts), “Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility is the continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute
to economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their
families as well as of the local community and society at large” . The CSR definition used
by Business for Social Responsibility is “Operating a business in a manner that meets or
exceeds the ethical, legal, commercial and public expectations that society has of busi-
ness” . The European Commission hedges its bets with two definitions wrapped into one:
“A concept whereby companies decide voluntarily to contribute to a better society and
a cleaner environment. A concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a
voluntary basis”
2Friedman (1962 and 1970) argued that a corporation’s purpose is to maximize returns
to its shareholders, and that since only people can have social responsibilities, corporations
are only responsible to their shareholders and not to society as a whole.
3For a discussion, see Benabou and Tirole (2010).
4Other approaches (Besley and Ghatak, 2010) identify CSR with creation of public
goods or reducing in public bads.
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results show that, provided a large enough market, the CSR firm obtains
a higher profit and improves social welfare. The intuition behind it is the
following. The environmental concern restrains the CSR production, while
the social concern expands it. The second effects more than offsets the first
one in a large market, because the weight of a large number of consumers
becomes stronger than the pollution weight. This makes the CSR production
strategy be more aggressive compared to the competitors’ strategy, and in
turn leads the CSR profit to be higher than the profit-seeker profit and social
welfare to improve.
We then investigate how the CSR influences the equilibrium when an
anti-pollution first-best taxation policy takes place. The presence of at least
one CSR firm makes the first best Pigouvian taxation more lenient for the
other firms. This happens since the CSR strategy induces the competitors
to lowers their output and thus their tax burden.
We finally analyse whether the CSR firm can influence the investments in
“green” Research and Development. We show that the profit seeking firms
invest in R&D in order to abate pollution because of the only presence of
the CSR firm, which still acts as a self-regulating tool. The reason is that
the CSR firm forces the remaining profit-seeking firms to take into account
the environmental cost, then they are willing to minimise it through R&D
investments.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly
discusses the related literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4
shows how the presence of a CSR firm influences the market equilibrium,
profits and welfare. In Section 5 we study the first best taxation with and
without a CSR firm in the industry. Section 6 examines whether the CSR firm
can induce Cournot firms to invest in green technology. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Related literature
The paper can be related to three different branches of the economic litera-
ture, namely the literature on mixed oligopoly, efficiency inducing taxation
and Corporate Social Responsibility.
After the seminal paper due to Merril and Schneider (1966), the litera-
ture on mixed oligopoly started developing only in the eighties5. De Fraja
and Delbono (1989) showed that, if a public firm may wish to maximise in-
dustry welfare, its pursuit of this objective in interaction with private profit
maximiser firm will lead to obtain a greater profit than that obtained by its
otherwise identical private competitors. Cremer et al. (1989) suggest that to
nationalise a single existing firm can be socially optimal if there are no other
public firms in the industry, in some cases, nationalising the whole industry
might be best, although unrealistic. De Fraja (1991) shows that the pres-
ence of a public firm in an oligopoly may improve the overall efficiency of the
industry. This occurs as the low prices set by the public producer forces the
private firms to cut their costs to match their prices. This effect is obtained
even if the public firm has a certain grade of inefficiency compared to the
private firm. Most recently, Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) elaborate
this latest approach by endogenising production costs through cost-reducing
activities. They show that the private firm cost becomes lower than the pub-
lic firm cost because the former engages in excessive strategic cost-reducing
activities. In relation to these contributions, we borrow the mixed oligopoly
framework and substitute the CSR firm to the public firm.
In the literature on efficiency-inducing taxation, Bergstrom et al. (1981)
examines the taxation of a monopolist supplier of a non-renewable resource.
Both the government and the monopolist have complete information about
demand, cost and reserves, and the government is assumed to use a linear
taxation policy. They show that there is a group of tax-subsidy policies
5See De Fraja and Delbono (1990) for a survey.
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that would induce the monopolist to follow the efficient production path of
a competitive industry. Karp and Livernois (1992) show that an efficiency-
inducing taxation result can be obtained also by relaxing the assumption of
the government complete information about the monopolist cost function and
reserves. Karp and Livernois (1994) examine the problem of knowing the level
of pollution abatement in the absence of information about abatement costs.
They show that the problem can be solved through an iterative procedure in
which the tax is adjusted when current emission exceed or fall short of the
target. Benchekroun and Long (1998 and 2002) examine the design of a tax-
inducing system in an oligopolistic and monopolistic industry. They show
that there always exists a tax rule leading oligopolists (monopolist) to reach
the socially optimum production level. Like in this literature, in Section 5
we study the first best taxation to prevent the negative externality.
The literature on CSR only recently started developing in the economic
literature. One strand identifies CSR with creation of public goods or cur-
tailment of public bads (Bagnoli and Watts, 2003, Kotchen, 2006, Besley
and Ghatak, 2010), generally showing that there is a close parallel between
CSR so defined and the results obtained by the models of private provision
of public goods. Other contributes study the desirability of CSR (Baron,
2001), the role of CSR in selecting motivated agents (Brekke and Nyborg,
2005) or the firm competition in the presence of “green” consumers. (Arora
and Gangopdhyay, 1995).
3 The model
We study a static oligopoly market with n > 2 firms. Firms supply a homo-
geneous good, whose market demand function is p = a−Q, a being a positive
constant parameter measuring the reservation price and Q =
∑n
i=1 qi being
the sum of all firms’ individual output levels qi. Production takes place at
constant returns to scale with a marginal cost c ∈ (0, a) , common to all
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firms. Hence firm i’s profit function will be pii = (p− c)qi.
The production of the final output goes along with a negative environ-
mental externality E = gQ, where g > 0 represents the marginal polluting
intensity of output. Consumer surplus is measured by CS = Q2/2. Social
welfare is defined as the sum of industry profits and consumer surplus, minus
pollution:
W =
n∑
i=1
pii +
Q2
2
− gQ. (1)
Throughout the paper, for notational simplicity we shall define the market
size as m = a− c.
Initially we consider the case with n profit-maximising firms competing
a` la Cournot-Nash. We will refer to these as “Cournot firms”. The market
equilibrium is the traditional Cournot result and it is given by:
qCN =
m
1 + n
. (2)
Individual equilibrium profits are:
piCN =
(
m
1 + n
)2
. (3)
Correspondingly, consumer surplus is:
CSCN =
1
2
(
m
1 + n
)2, (4)
and social welfare is:
WCN =
(
(2n+ 1)
2
(
m
1 + n
)
− g
)(
m
1 + n
)
. (5)
Consider now the same industry with n − 1 Cournot firms denoted as
i ∈ {1, 2, .., j − 1, j + 1, ...n}, and a single CSR firm, denoted as j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
According to the “European Union Paper on Corporate Social Responsibil-
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ity” , CSR companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their
business operations. Within the company, socially responsible practices pri-
marily involve employees and relate to issues such as investing in human
capital, health and safety, and managing change, while environmentally re-
sponsible practices relate mainly to the management of natural resources
used in the production. Out of the company, CSR practices involve a wide
range of stakeholders: business partners and suppliers, customers, public
authorities and local communities, as well as the environment.
Thus we need to assume a specific CSR objective structure. For the
environmental concern, we assume that the CSR firm internalises its own
share of pollution. All the other social concerns can be interpreted in our
model as part of consumer surplus, hence we assume that the CSR firm is
sensitive to it. Thus the CSR objective function is:
p˜ij = pij − gqj + z (qj +Q−j)
2
2
, (6)
where Q−j =
∑
i 6=j qi and z ∈ [0, 1] denotes the weight that firm j assigns to
consumer surplus.
To begin with, we would like to dwell upon the features of first order
conditions and the resulting map of best replies. The behaviour of any of the
n − 1 Cournot firms is altogether standard, and is summarised by the best
reply function:
q∗i =
m−Q−i
2
. (7)
On the other hand, the CSR’s reaction function explicitly incorporates its
concerns about consumer surplus and environmental effects:
q∗j =
m− g − (1− z)Q−j
2− z . (8)
the above reaction function is flatter than a standard Cournot best reply,
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since: ∣∣∣∣ ∂q∗j∂Q−j
∣∣∣∣ = 1− z2− z < 12 always, (9)
with ∣∣∣∣ ∂2q∗j∂Q−j∂z
∣∣∣∣ = − 1(2− z)2 < 0, (10)
for all admissible values of z. Moreover, the intercept of q∗j along the axes of
qj is
q∗j
∣∣
Q−j=0
=
m− g
2− z ≷
m
2
, for all m ≷ 2g
z
. (11)
On this basis, we may offer a preliminary qualitative assessment of the CSR
firm’s attitude in the following terms:
Lemma 1 The CSR’s best reply is flatter than that of any of its Cournot
rivals, and becomes increasingly flatter as z increases. The monopoly output
of the CSR is larger (resp., lower) than the pure profit-seeking monopoly
output for all m > 2g/z (resp. m < 2g/zt).
The above Lemma deserves a few comments. On the one hand, all else
equal, flattening the best reply entails that the output decision of the CSR
firm becomes less sensitive to any change in the rivals’ output, and therefore
we shall expect to observe a sort of more aggressive behaviour on its part,
than what would otherwise emerge from a strict profit-seeking behaviour. On
the other hand, the intercept of the CSR firm’s reaction function shifts up or
down depending on market size. If the market is large enough, the inclusion
of corporate social responsibility in the statute of the firm necessarily brings
about the consequence that the CSR will produce more than a standard
Cournot unit (because the function is flatter and the intercept is higher). If,
conversely, the market is below the critical threshold, the balance between
the two effects is a priori ambiguous.
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Figure 1. Lemma 1.
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Now we can proceed to characterise the market equilibrium. The firms’
optimal outputs are given by:
qj = m− n(m(1− z) + g)
1 + n− z , (12)
and
qi =
m(1− z) + g
1 + n− z . (13)
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The CSR-firm profits are:
pij =
(m(1− z) + g)(m((n− 1)z + 1)− gn)
(1 + n− z)2 , (14)
while the profits of any individual Cournot firm are:
pii =
(m(1− z) + g)2
(1 + n− z)2 . (15)
Consumer surplus is:
CSCSR =
(g −mn)2
2(1 + n− z)2 , (16)
and social welfare amounts to:
WCSR =
(g −mn)(m(2z − 2− n) + 2g(n− z))
2(1 + n− z)2 . (17)
4 Results
In this section we show how the presence of the CSR modifies the equilibrium
performance of the industry. The following proposition focusses on profits
and social welfare.
Proposition 1 The necessary and sufficient condition ensuring that pij > pii
and WCSR > WCN is that
m > max
{
g(1 + n)
nz
,
g(1 + n)(1 + 2(n− z))
n(2− z) + 2(1− z)
}
,
with
max
{
g(1 + n)
nz
,
g(1 + n)(1 + 2(n− z))
n(2− z) + 2(1− z)
}
=
g(1 + n)
nz
,
for all nz < 1, and
max
{
g(1 + n)
nz
,
g(1 + n)(1 + 2(n− z))
n(2− z) + 2(1− z)
}
=
g(1 + n)(1 + 2(n− z))
n(2− z) + 2(1− z) ,
9
for all nz > 1.
Proof. First, we need to ensure that profits are positive. This is true for all
m > g(1+n)/ (nz). Then, considerWCSR−WCN , which is a quadratic expres-
sion in m. It is then a matter of trivial algebra to check that WCSR = WCN
in m = g(1 +n)/ (nz) and m = g(1 +n)(1 + 2(n− z))/ [n(2− z) + 2(1− z)] ,
WCSR −WCN being positive for external values.
Case I: if nz < 1, then
g(1 + n)
nz
>
g(1 + n)(1 + 2(n− z))
n(2− z) + 2(1− z) . (18)
The profit difference is
pij − pii = (g −m(z − 1))((mnz − g(1− n))
(1 + n− z)2 , (19)
which is positive for all m > gn/ (1 + (n− 1)z), with
gn
1 + (n− 1)z <
g(1 + n)
nz
, (20)
always. Therefore, in this region
m >
g(1 + n)
nz
, (21)
is necessary and sufficient to ensure both pij > pii and WCSR > WCN .
Case II: if nz > 1, then
g(1 + n)(1 + 2(n− z))
n(2− z) + 2(1− z) >
g(1 + n)
nz
. (22)
Consequently, in this region, pij > pii and WCSR > WCN for all m > g(1 +
n)(1 + 2(n− z))/ [n(2− z) + 2(1− z)].
10
Figure 2. Proposition 1.
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Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 1. The vertical dashed line separates the
area where nz < 1 from that in which nz > 1. Proposition 1 shows that, in a
large enough market, it is more profitable being a CSR rather than a Cournot
firm. Also, the presence of a CSR firm can improve social welfare as compared
to a situation in which all firms are pure profit-seeking agents. The reason is
that the presence of the CSR firm forces the remaining profit-seeking firms to
take into account both the negative environmental externality and consumer
surplus, although only indirectly via the intersection of best reply functions.
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The results of Proposition 1 change according to whether the CSR assigns a
high or low weight to consumer surplus, i.e., if nz is greater or smaller than
one. However, the message behind the results does not change irrespective
of nz.
4.1 Comparative statics
In this section we examine how the CSR’s weight assigned to consumer sur-
plus z affects both the CSR and the Cournot-firms profit. The following
corollary shows these comparative statics properties.
Corollary 1 If n < (1−z)
(1−2z) , the CSR-firm profit increases as z increases if
m > g
n
and decreases otherwise; if n > (1−z)
(1−2z) , the CSR profit increases as
z increases if m > 2gn
1−z−n(1−2z) or m <
g
n
and diminishes otherwise. The
Cournot-firm profit increases as z increases if m < g
n
and diminishes other-
wise.
Proof. Differentiation of pij with respect to z yields
∂pij
∂z
= (mn−g)(2gn+m(n−1+z−2nz))
(1+n−z)3 .
Solving by m, we have 2 solutions, g
n
and 2gn
1−z−n(1−2z) . The derivative is pos-
itive for external values to the solutions. If n < (1−z)
(1−2z) , the second solution is
negative, so the derivative is positive when m > g
n
. If n > (1−z)
(1−2z) , the former
is higher than the latter and both solutions are positive. Differentiation of pii
with respect to z yields ∂pii
∂z
= (mn−g)(g+m(1−z))
(1+n−z)3 , which is always positive for
m < g
n
.
Following Corollary 1, the CSR sensitivity to consumer surplus affects
profits differently according to the firm type.
For the CSR firm the relationship between the firm profit and z is related
both on the market size and on the number of firms in the market. In
particular, with few firms, the relationship is positive given a large market
size. With a large number of firms, the relationship is positive with a small
market size.
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For the Cournot firms, the CSR sensitivity to consumer surplus is posi-
tively related to its profits if the market is small and negatively related if the
market is large, irrespective of the number of firms in the industry.
5 CSR with Cournot-taxation and first best
In this section we study the introduction of an anti-pollution first-best taxa-
tion. Again, we compare the case with all Cournot firms to the case with one
CSR firm and n−1 Cournot firms. In the second case, only the Cournot firms
pay the Pigouvian tax. Indeed the CSR firm is exempted since it internalises
its own pollution.
With n Cournot firms, their profit function is:
pi = (p− c)q − τE, (23)
where τ ∈ [0, 1] is the tax rate, and the consumer surplus becomes CSτ =
Q2
2
+nτE. The market equilibrium is reached when qCNτ =
m−gτ
1+n
, and social
welfare is WCNτ =
n(m(2+n)+g(n(τ−2)−2))(m−gτ)
2(1+n)2
. The first best taxation is ob-
tained by maximising WCNτ with respect to τ, which yields
gn(g(1+n−nτ)−m)
(1+n)2
=
0. Thus the first best tax rate is τCN =
g(1+n)−m
gn
. By substituting τCN in
WCNτ , we obtain the first best social welfare defined as WFB =
(g−m)2
2
.
Consider now the case where n− 1 Cournot firms pay a tax t. Consumer
surplus now is CSt =
Q2
2
+(n−1)tE. The market equilibrium is reached when
the quantities are qit =
m(z−1)+g(2(n−1)t−1)
(n−1)(z−3) for all i ∈ {1, 2, .., j − 1, j + 1, ...n}
and qjt =
g(2(n−1)t(1+z))−m(z−1)
(n−1)(z−3) . Social welfare is:
WCSRt =
(g(1− t(n− 1)(z − 1))− 2m)(2m(z − 2) + g(5 + t(n− 1)(z − 1)− 2z))
2(z − 3)2 .
(24)
The level of t that guarantees the first best is obtained by equating WCSRt
to WFB. By solving for t we have tCSR =
m(1−z)+g(z−2)
g(n−1)(z−1) . We define as pijt and
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piit the profits of the CSR and Cournot firm, respectively, when t = tCSR.
The following proposition shows the properties of this market equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If m > 2g−gz+g(z(4−3z))
1
2
2(1−z) , then:
(i) profits are positive for every firm in the market;
(ii) tCSR is positive;
(iii) τCN > tCSR;
(iv) if m < 2g−gz+g(z(4n(1−z)+z))
1
2
2(1−z) , then pijt > piit
Proof. First, we need to ensure that profits are positive. By substituting
tCSR in the CSR-firm profit, we obtain pijt =
zg2
1−z , which is always positive. By
substituting tCSR in the Cournot-firm profit, we obtain piit =
m2+g2+mg 2−z
z−1
n−1 .
This is positive if m > 2g−gz+g(z(4−3z))
1
2
2(1−z) . Then consider when tCSR > 0. This
occurs for all m > g(z−2)
1−z . Finally, the case where τCN > tCSR is verified for all
m > g(1−n(z−2)+n
2(z−1)−z)
1−z . By comparing the three critical point, it is possible
to see that if m > 2g−gz+g(z(4−3z))
1
2
2(1−z) all the properties hold. Finally, pijt > piit
for all m < 2g−gz+g(z(4n(1−z)+z))
1
2
2(1−z) . This is always higher than
2g−gz+g(z(4−3z)) 12
2(1−z)
so a range exists where pijt > piit.
Figure 3 shows Proposition 2. On the right of m2 firms cannot obtain
positive profits. On the left of m1 every profit is positive, and the unitary tax
paid by the Cournot firms is lower in the presence of a CSR firm. Inbetween
the two curves the profit obtained by a CSR firm is higher than the profit
obtained by a Cournot firm.
The main result of Proposition 2 is that the tax burden of profit-seeking
firms is more lenient given the presence of a CSR firm. Thus the presence of
a CSR firm in the industry may be desirable for their competitors also.
14
Figure 3. Proposition 2.
m1 = ((2g − gz + g(z(4− 3z))(1/2))/(2(1− z)))
m2 = ((2g − gz + g(z(4n(1− z) + z))(1/2))/(2(1− z)))
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z10
τCN > tCSR > 0
pijt > piit > 0
m1 m2
τCN > tCSR > 0, piit > pijt > 0
pijt, piit < 0
6 CSR and R&D
In this section we investigate whether the presence of a CSR firm can induce
Cournot firms to invest in “green Research and Development” (from now on,
R&D). To do so, we consider a previous stage of the game where firms can
undertake costly R&D projects.
We rewrite the Cournot-firms profit function as piiRD = (p − c)qi − bk2i
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and the CSR-firm objective function as:
p˜ij = pij − gqj + z (qj +Q−j)
2
2
− bk2j , (25)
where ki,j > 0 is the amount of investment in R&D of a Cournot and CSR
firm, respectively, and b > 0 is a parameter. Finally, we assume that the
intensity of the output in polluting environment is now measured by g =
g¯−
n−1∑
ki−kj, where g¯ is the highest level of pollution intensity, which occurs
when no R&D actions take place whatsoever. Thus the investment in R&D
diminishes the impact of the output in polluting. Our modelisation relies on
the simplifying assumption that the green innovation is a public good freely
appropriable by all firms alike without legal consequences whatsoever.
We solve the problem by backward induction. The market equilibrium in
the second stage of the game is still given by Eq. (12) and Eq. (13) with the
new assumptions on g.
In the first stage, firms decide their optimal R&D investment. We can
easily notice that, in absence of a CSR firm, the Cournot firms’ investments
in R&D would be nought. The reason is that the first order condition of piiRD
in the first stage of the game with only Cournot firms is clearly −2bki = 0,
thus ki = 0. A remedy could be the introduction of Pigouvian taxation by a
regulator, as shown in Poyago-Theotoky (2007).
Consider now the presence of the CSR firm in the industry. The first
order condition of p˜ij with respect to kj yields to −2bkj = 0, thus the optimal
investment in R&D for a CSR firm is zero. This is intuitive. The CSR firm
already incorporated the cost of pollution in its output decisions, so investing
in R&D would be like paying for it twice.
Let us turn on the Cournot firms. The first order condition of piiRD with
respect to ki yields:
2(m(z − 1) + ki + kw(n− 2)− g¯)
(n+ 1− z)2 − 2bki = 0, (26)
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where kw, w 6= i, j, is the R&D investment of the Cournot firms different
from i.
The following lemma tells us for which parameter values the solution is a
maximum point.
Lemma 2 We are in a maximum point if and only if b ≥ 1
(n+1−z)2 .
Proof. The second order condition of piiRD with respect to ki yields −2b +
2
(n+1−z)2 ≤ 0. This is satisfied by all b ≥ 1(n+1−z)2 .
In equilibrium, all Cournot firms make identical choices in R&D invest-
ment because of their a priori symmetry, ki = kw = k. Using it in (26) and
solving, we obtain:
k∗ =
m(1− z) + g¯
n− 1− b(1 + n− z)2 (27)
From this result we can derive the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 For b ≥ 1
(n+1−z)2 , the presence of a CSR firm induces Cournot
firms to invest in R&D.
Proof. As we previously stated, with no CSR firms the investment in R&D
for a Cournot firm is zero. The proposition is true if k∗ > 0. We can notice
that the numerator is always positive, since z < 1, and so is the denominator.
Hence k∗ > 0 is always positive.
The presence of the CSR firm is sufficient by itself to induce profit seeking
firms to invest in R&D, without any need of government regulation. The
intuition lies in the same argument considered in Section 4. The CSR forces
Cournot firms to implement pollution as a negative element within their
reaction function. This gives them an incentive to invest in R&D to minimise
the pollution cost.
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7 Conclusion
This paper investigates how the presence of a CSR firm influences a Cournot
oligopoly with pollution. In a large market, a CSR firm has higher profits
than a profit-seeking firm, and its presence improves social welfare. Yet, at
least one CSR firm makes the first best Pigouvian taxation more lenient for
Cournot firms. We finally consider whether the CSR firm can influence the
investments in “green” technology. We show that the profit-seeking firms
invest in R&D in order to abate pollution because of the only presence of the
CSR firm, which still acts as a self-regulating tool.
We have assumed that firms cannot change type. The presence of a CSR
firm may induce other pure profit-seeking units to adopt a CSR statute as
well. The analysis of this perspective and its consequences in the evolution
of the industry is left for future research.
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